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APPELLANTS 
Melvin E. Ingersoll, Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. 
Ingersoll and Evelyn E. Ingersoll ("INGERSOLLS") plaintiffs in 
intervention below in case no. C-85-07 90. R-112, R-116, and 
filed a motion to intervene in the predecessor case of Salt Lake 
City Corporation v. Mountain Fuel Supply, C-78-7764. 
R.D. Patterson ("PATTERSON") defendant and defendant in 
intervention below in case no. C-85-0790. R-2, R-112, R-116. 
RESPONDENT 
Interstate Land Corporation ("INTERSTATE LAND") plaintiff in 
intervention below in case no. C-85-07 90. R-2. Interstate's 
sister company, Mountain Fuel Supply was the Defendant in the 
predecessor case of Salt Lake City Corporation v. Mountain Fuel 
Supply, C-78-7764. 
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JURISDICTION 
Appellants Ingersolls appeal an entry of final judgment 
denying their motion to intervene dated September 4, 1986, R-146. 
Appellant Patterson appeals an entry of final judgment 
granting Respondent Interstate Land's motion for summary judgment 
against Appellant Patterson dated September 4, 1986. R-149. 
Appellants ingersolls and Patterson appeal from the 
"Memorandum Opinion and Order" by the Honorable Michael R. 
Murphy, District Judge, dated December 2, 1986, denying 
Appellants motions to correct the previous orders of September 4, 
1986. R-177. 
Notice of appeal was timely filed on December 30, 1986. 
R-187. Hence this Court has jurisdiction over this matter 
pursuant to Art. VIIIf § 9 of the Utah Constitution Rule 3, 
U.R.A.P., as well as Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (1953) (amended 
1987) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. APPELLANTS' OWNERSHIP OF PROPERTY IN QUESTION 
A. Whether each of the four Ingersolls and Patterson are the 
owners of an undivided 1/5 interest in and to said property in 
question? 
B. Whether at all times from and after October, 1977 
Appellants Ingersolls and/or Patterson have been in actual 
physical possession of and have visibly, openly, notoriously, 
- 1 -
continually possessed and used the disputed property under a 
claim of title and ownership thereto? 
C. Whether Appellants Ingersolls are "purchasers" within the 
meaning of § 78-12-13, UCA, 1953? 
D. Whether the trial court's granting of summary judgment 
against in favor of Respondent Interstate Land and against 
Appellant Patterson was proper? 
II. APPELLANTS' (INGERSOLLS) MOTION TO INTERVENE 
A. Whether the trial court erred in not allowing Ingersolls 
to intervene in the action below? 
B. Whether Ingersolls are necessary parties and/or whether 
their property rights are effected by the lower court's orders? 
III. APPEAL OF ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. Whether Ingersoll's Rule 59 U.R.Civ.P motion was 
proper? 
B. Whether the lower court erred in holding that a trial 
must be held before a Rule 59 U.R.Civ.P motion may be brought? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action to establish title and ownership of certain 
real property. The disputed property is West half of Glendale 
Avenue and the South half of First South Street, West of 1100 
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West in Salt Lake City, Utah, dedicated streets located in Blocks 
43, 44, 53 and 54 of Plat "C" of the Salt Lake County Survey in 
Salt Lake County, Utah, as vacated by the City of Salt Lake by an 
ordinance passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, 
Utah on October 5, 1977. (Copy of vacation ordinance 172 attached 
as Exhibit I; copy of vacation ordinance 173 attached as Exhibit 
II). 
Respondent Interstate Land Corporation ("INTERSTATE LAND") 
brought this action seeking to quiet title to the disputed real 
property described above. R-2. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
On December 14, 1978, Salt Lake City Corporation filed a 
complaint against Mountain Fuel Supply in case no. C-78-7764, a 
predecessor action to the case below. T-198. The lawsuit was 
filed as a result of Salt Lake City vacating the disputed 
property through Salt Lake City Ordinances 172 and 173 described 
above and then passing an ordinance to undo the said vacation, 
and was filed to determine ownership to the disputed property 
described above. T-197-198. 
Appellants Ingersolls as well as the Lemel Corporation, filed 
a motion to intervene (Exhibit III) and Mountain Fuel filed a 
motion for summary judgment against Appellants as well as Salt 
Lake City Corporation. T-197 (Exhibit IV). On August 31, 1982 
by minute entry Mountain Fuel Supply's motion for summary 
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judgment against interveners was granted. On September 13f 1982, 
the court granted Mountain Fuel's Motion for summary judgment 
against Appellants' Ingersolls and Lemel Corporation for failure 
to attend the hearing on Mountain Fuel's motion for summary 
judgment. (Exhibit V). On December 23, 1983, the court granted 
Mountain Fuel's motion for summary judgment against Salt Lake 
City, holding that Ordinances 172 and 173 which vacated the 
above-described property were valid and that title to the land 
described in each of the ordinances vested in the abutting 
landowners. (Exhibit VI). 
Respondent Interestate Land brought the present action 
seeking to quiet title to the disputed vacated portions of the 
streets as described above. R-2. Interstate Land claims title 
to the vacated portions of the disputed property vested in it 
while. Appellants Patterson and Ingersoll allege that title to 
the vacated portions of the disputed property vested in them. 
R-4, R-116. 
Respondent Interstate Land moved for summary judgment against 
Appellant Patterson. R-85. By minute entry dated July 28, 1986, 
Judge Fishier, granted Respondent Interstate Land's motion for 
Summary Judgment and summarily denied Appellants Ingersolls' 
motion to intervene* R-144. The respective orders representing 
the above holding were signed by Judge Daniels on September 4, 
1986. R-146, R-149. Appellants Patterson and Ingersolls brought 
a motion to correct the order on September 13, 1986. R-154. Said 
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motion was denied by the "Memorandum Order and Opinion" of Judge 
Murphy dated December 2, 1986. R-177. (Exhibit VII). This appeal 
followed. R-187. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The disputed property, ("VACATED STREET PROPERTY") used to 
be part of First South Street and part of Glendale streetf a 
north-south street which intersects with First South between 1100 
and 1200 West. R-86. Said property is more particularly 
described: 
(a) in a copy of the trust deed attached as Exhibit "A" to 
Respondent's complaint in the action below; R-17. 
(b) in the quit-claim deed of July 27, 1979 from Lemel 
Corporation ("LEMEL") to Appellant Patterson; R-125. 
(c) as parcels # 8 and 9 in the Trustees Deed of June 3, 
1982 from NACM International ("NACM") to General Brewing Company 
("GENERAL BREWING"); R-126. 
(d) also shown in the plot map. R-84, R-129. 
The disputed property was the West half of Glendale Avenue 
and the South half of First South Streets, West of 1100 West in 
Salt Lake City, Utahf as vacated by the City of Salt Lake by 
ordinance passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City 
on October 5f 1977. (Exhibits I & II). The predecessor case of 
Salt Lake City Corporation v. Mountain Fuel Supply, Case No. 
78-7764 resolved the issue that the ordinances vacating the 
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vacated street property were valid and that title to said 
property vested in the abutting landowners. 
At the time that said streets were vacated each of the four 
Ingersolls were the owners of an undivided 1/5 and and Lemel was 
the owner of an undivided 1/5 of the real property abutting 
("ABUTTING PROPERTY") the disputed property. At all time from 
October, 1977, Ingersolls and Patterson have been in actual 
physical possession of and have visibly, openly, notoriously, 
continuously possessed and used the disputed property under a 
claim of title and ownership thereto, which claim has at all 
times been hostile and adverse to the claims of all persons and 
organizations, including the claims of Interstate and of the 
persons and organizations through whom Interstate claims to have 
derived its title. By operation of law when said streets were 
vacated fee title to an undivided 1/5 of the disputed property 
reverted to and vested in each of the four Ingersolls and Lemel. 
R-117. Lemel thereafter conveyed its undivided 1/5 ownership 
interest in and to the disputed property to Patterson by a 
quit-claim deed. R-125. 
The abutting property was pledged by Ingersolls and Lemel as 
security for an obligation owed by them to General Brewing by a 
trust deed executed in July, 1977. R-132. Said pledge was made 
before the vacating ordinances were determined to be valid. 
The disputed property was not pledged as security for said debt 
by said trust deed. After acquisition of title to the disputed 
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property (May, 1980) Ingersolls conveyed their interest in the 
abutting property to Lemel by quit-claim deed, R-137, and Lemel 
thereupon became owner of 100% of the abutting property. 
Ingersolls did not convey the disputed property to Lemel. 
Lemel failed to pay the obligation secured by the trust deed, 
R-132, and General Brewing caused a notice of default of said 
trust deed to be filed about September, 1979, R-139. In said 
notice of default General Brewing asserted no claim to the 
disputed property. 
Thereafter, Lemel filed a petition in bankruptcy in the 
United States District Court for the District of Utah, Central 
Division, case No. 80-00755. The disputed property was not 
listed as an asset of Lemel in the bankruptcy. (Exhibit VIII). 
In that bankruptcy, NACM was appointed as trustee of Lemel. 
By a "Trustees Deed" R-126 NACM sold and conveyed the abutting 
property (parcels #1 through 7) and purported to sell the 
disputed property (parcels #8 and 9) to General Brewing. NACM 
appeared before the U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, representing that the 
vacated street property had been erroneously omitted from the 
legal description in the Trustee's Notice. Title to the vacated 
street property was never deeded to the bankruptcy Lemel, but 
rather was held by Appellants. Based upon NACM's 
representations, the Bankruptcy Court held that NACM could convey 
the vacated street property, which it allegedly did to General 
Brewing. R-46. The General Brewing then purported to convey 
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the disputed property to Interstate by a special warranty deed 
R-61. 
Respondent claims as remote grantee under that trust deed 
foreclosure through the bankruptcy court and acquired no better 
title to the disputed parcel than the title of General Brewing. 
Since General Brewing never had a trust deed covering, or other 
interest in the disputed property, plaintiff acquired no interest 
in and to the disputed parcel and cannot now assert a quiet-title 
thereto. The first mention of the disputed property in 
plaintiff's chain of title is when the bankruptcy trustee added 
the disputed property to the description of the abutting property 
sold by the trustee. Since the bankrupt corporation had never 
acquired Ingersolls 4/5 interest in the property, and the 
corporation had deeded its 1/5 interest to Patterson, the 
bankrupt corporation did not have title to the disputed property 
the trustee acquired no title when he could convey to plaintiff. 
Accordingly, plaintiff acquired nothing by that conveyance. 
Since Lemel did not have title to the disputed property R-126 
conveyed nothing to General Brewing and the deed from General 
Brewing to Interstate R-61 conveyed nothing to Interestate. 
However, said deeds cloud Appellants' title to the disputed 
property. 
STATEMENT OP RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Court should quiet title to a 1/5 interest in and to the 
- 8 -
disputed property in the names of each of the Ingersolls and 
Patterson, and declare that Interstate has no right, title or 
interest therein. Further, the Court should rule that it is 
appropriate for Appellants to bring a Rule 59 U.R.Civ.P motion 
from an order granting summary judgment. 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
Appellants Patterson and Ingersolls contend that they hold 
title to the vacated street property and are the lawful owners 
thereof. Appellants contend that they have owned the adjoining 
and abutting property to the vacated street property when said 
property was vacated and that title to said property properly 
vested in them pursuant to § 78-12-13, UCA, 1953 as amended. 
In the alternative, Appellants allege title and ownership to the 
disputed vacated street property through the doctrine of adverse 
possession. 
Appellants claim ownership of said property by adverse 
possession Factual issues concerning adverse possession require a 
trial and cannot properly be determined on a motion for summary 
judgment. Ingersolls should be permitted to intervene and the 
summary judgment against Patterson should be reversed and they 
should be permitted to litigate their quiet-title claim against 
plaintiff. 
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Appellants Patterson and Ingersolls contend that the trial 
court erred in not allowing them to intervene in the actions 
below. Appellants further contend that they are necessary 
parties and that the disposition of this action impairs and 
impedes their property rights and interests. 
Appellants Patterson and Ingersolls contend that a motion 
under Rule 59 U.R.Civ.P. is appropriate following an order 
granting summary judgment. Appellants finally contend that a 
full trial is not a necessary predicate act to bringing a motion 
under Rule 59 U.R.Civ.P. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. APPELLANTS OWN THE VACATED STREET PROPERTY 
A. Appellants each owned 1/5 interest in vacated street 
property in 1977. The undisputed facts demonstrate that the 
Appellants and each of them owned an undivided 1/5 interest to 
and to said property in 1977f having purchased said property and 
giving a trust deed back to Backman Abstract & Title Company, as 
trustee on July 6, 1977. R-87 
B. Utah is a lien not a title theory state. The trustee 
under the trust deed which described the abutting property (the 
trust deed did not include the disputed property in the 
description of the property pledged under the trust deed) was not 
the "owner of record" of the abutting property. The "owner" of 
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real property is the record owner. A trustee under a trust deed 
holds only a lien or security interest in the property by reason 
of the trust deed and is not the "owner" so as to vest ownership 
of the vacated street in the trustee under the trust deed. Bybee 
v. Stuart, 112 Utah 462, 189 P.2d 118 (1948) ;See generally, 
U.S. v. Loosley, 551 P.2d 506 (1976); Summary of Utah Real 
Property Law, Vol 1 § 9.36. Appellants recognize that these 
citations refer to mortgages and that no known Utah cases refer 
to Deeds of Trust, although it is believed that the same 
principal of law applies to trust deeds as to mortgages. 
When the street was vacated ownership of said street vested 
in Ingersolls and Lemel, the record owners of the abutting 
property. Carrying the Court's decision to its logical 
conclusion, had the trust deed covering the adjacent property 
been paid and the trust deed released, the trustee would still be 
the "owner" of the vacated street, a completely illogical and 
incorrect result. 
C. Ingersolls conveyance to corporation did not include 
conveyance of title to the vacated street. The Court erred in 
adopting as a finding of fact 1f 14, R-89, thereof in that the 
Court improperly determined that Ingersolls "quit-claimed to 
Lemel Corporation whatever right, title or interest they may have 
had in the same real property described in the July 6, 1977 Trust 
Deed." Said quit-claim deed and trust deed did not include the 
disputed property in the legal description of the property 
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pledged or conveyed. See R-132. Accordinglyf said finding of 
fact is incorrect and misleading, should be corrected, and as a 
consequence the holding of the court should be changed. 
D. Bankruptcy Trustee did not own vacated street and attempt 
to convey same was a nullity. The Court erred in adopting 1[ 17 
and 18, R-90, without adding thereto the finding and/or 
conclusion that since 4/5 ownership of the vacated street was not 
conveyed to Lemel by Ingersolls and since Lemel had conveyed its 
1/5 interest in said vacated street to Patterson before the 
bankruptcy was filedf Lemel had no ownership in the vacated 
street and that the trustees1 deed purporting to convey title to 
the vacated street was a nullity. 
E. Appellants acquired title by adverse possession. In 
order to state a valid claim for quiet-title Respondent was 
required to, but failed to allege that plaintiff and/or its 
grantor were "seized or possessed of the property in question 
within seven years" as required by 78-12-5, 78-12-6,et seq., 
UCA, 1953. Plaintiff did not (and cannot truthfully) make such 
allegations and therefore is precluded from summary judgment 
quieting title. 
Appellants claim adverse possession of the disputed property, 
and issues of fact with respect to said adverse possession 
preclude summary judgment. 
P. Statute of limitations bars plaintiff's claims. 
Ingersolls' complaint in intervention (third defense) asserts 
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that plaintiff's claim is time barred. R-118. Issues of fact 
concerning that defense precludes summary judgment. The same 
issues are applicable to Patterson. 
G. Waiver and estoppel Ingersolls1 complaint in 
intervention asserts the defenses of waiver and estoppel. R-118. 
If for any reason the vacated street was included in the property 
pledged as security under the trust deed (which we deny), the 
holder of the trust deed waived its right to assert said claim by 
failing to include that property in the trust deed foreclosure 
and/or by reason thereof said trust deed holder and persons 
claiming through the trust deed holder are estopped to now assert 
a claim to said property. Fact issues concerning those matters 
precludes summary judgment. The same issues are applicable to 
Patterson. 
POINT II. APPELLANTS SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO INTERVENE 
A. Intervention as a matter of right. 
Since Ingersolls claim an interest in the property in dispute 
they should have been permitted to intervene as provided in 
24(a)(3), 24(b)(1), 24(b)(2), 24(c), URCP. See R-112. 
Ingersolls were unfairly taken by surprise at the hearing on the 
motion for permission to intervene by plaintiff's argument that 
their right to intervene might be affected by the holding in 
another case involving these parties. 
B. Intervention is appropriate Appellants are 
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indispensible parties, their intervention involves identical 
issues of fact and law. 
Finally, should this Court rule that intervention was 
properly denied. Appellants will be forced to file yet another 
lawsuit against Respondent's for a final resolution of this 
matter. Such an action would not result in judicial economy. 
Therefore, the matter should be resolved here and now. 
To deny Appellants1 motion to intervene under the 
circumstances was error which should be corrected by permitting 
them to intervene, requiring plaintiff to respond to their 
counterclaim, bring the matter to issue, then by making an 
appropriate determination in the usual fashion. To deny 
intervention is to deny procedural due process. When the 
application for intervention is made timely, this rule permits 
intervention as a matter of right when the applicant will be 
adversely affected by the trial court's disposition of property. 
Jenner v. Real Estate Services, 659 P.2d 1072 (Utah, 1983) , 
particularly where inteverner's interests will not be adequately 
represented. Lima v. Chambers, 657 P.2d 279 (Utah, 1982) 
overruling, Kesler v. Tate, 28 U.2d 355, 502 P.2d 565 (Utah, 
1972) . Intervention was allowed when inteverner might gain or 
lose by direct legal operation and effect of judgment. 
Commercial Block Realty Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty 
Co., 83 U. 414, 28 P.2d 1081. 
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C. Order denying intervention appealable 
Ingersolls believe that a review of said other case (Salt 
Lake City Corporation v. Mountain Fuel Supply, Case No. 
C-78-7764) shows that the decision in said case does not affect 
their right to intervene herein. The Court did not state a 
reason for denial of the motion to intervene, so it is uncertain 
as to whether or not that case was a consideration in such 
denial. (Exhibit V) . Such a decision is appealable under the 
reasoning and holding of Tracy v. University of Utah Hospital, 
619 P.2d 340 (Utah, 1980) as well as Commercial Block Realty 
Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 83 U. 414, 28 P.2d 
1081; See also Tripp v. District Court of Third Judicial Dist., 
89 U. 8, 56 P.2d 1355. 
D. Intervention proper and appropriate 
Since Ingersolls claim ownership of the parcel of property, 
title to which is herein sought to be quieted, they should be 
entitled to intervene, the issues should be framed, and the Court 
would then be in a position to properly rule on those matters 
after affording Ingersolls the right to participate in discovery. 
Intervention is properly denied where inteverner was not an 
indispensable party, intervention would unduly delay pending 
action or complicate issues, and his rights could be protected in 
independent action. Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. Hechler, 44 
U. 64, 138 P. 1159; Dayton v. Free, 49 U. 221, 162 P. 614. None 
of those situations exist here, which would deny Appellants the 
opportunity to intervene. 
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POINT III. ROLE 59 U.R.Civ.P MOTION IS PROPER FOLLOWING ORDER 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. Rule 59 U.R.Civ.P to be liberally construed 
Federal Rule 59 differs substantially from URCP 59. FRCP 
59(a)(1) speaks of a new trial following a jury trial and FRCP 
59(a)(2) speaks of an action tried without a juryf which 
strongly suggest that under Federal Procedure Rule 5 9 may only 
apply after there has been a formal trial with live witnesses. 
Notwithstanding that limiting language, many Federal Courts have 
held that a FRCP 59 motion will lie following a summary judgment 
(see cases cited below). URCP 59(a) omits that language 
concerning a jury or non-jury trial, and simply states that: 
"a new trial may be granted to all or any of 
the parties on all or part of the issues, for 
any of the following causes:" 
B. Summary judgment is a "Trial. UnlikeFRCP 59(a), URCP 
59(a)does not suggest that its application is limited to 
situations where there has been a formal trial with live 
witnesses. A summary judgment is a URCP 59 "trial" based upon 
the record and is appropriate only where there are no disputed 
issues of fact which require live testimony. The resulting 
summary judgment has the same force and effect as a judgment 
after hearing live witnesses. URCP 59 should be construed in 
such a manner as to permit the court to review and correct its 
judgment, so as to avoid an unnecessary appeal, whether the 
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judgment resulted from summary judgment or from a trial, since 
such a decision is a final decision on the merits. See Ray E. 
Friedman & Co. v. Jenkinsf 824 F.2d 657, 660 (8th Cir.f 1987); In 
Vreeken v. Davis, 718 F.2d 343 (10th Cir., 1983), the 10th 
Circuit upheld Judge Jenkins1 decision the Utah District Court 
concluding that regardless of how it is styled or construed, a 
motion filed within ten days of the entry of judgment questioning 
the correctness of a judgment is properly treated as a Rule 
59(e) motion. 
C. Federal cases relied upon by Judge Murphy are not 
persuasive. Judge Murphy cites Federal District Court decisions 
from Florida and Virginia, R-183, in support of his position that 
URCP 59 may not be used unless there has been a formal trial, but 
acknowledges that cases from the 6th and 9th Circuit Court of 
Appeals (cited on pages 7 and 8 of the Court's memorandum, R-183 
to R-184) hold that FRCP 59 may be used in summary judgment 
situations where there has been no formal trial. Other federal 
cases holding that FRCP 59(e) is a proper procedural vehicle to 
be used by a party seeking to vacate summary judgment even though 
there has been not trial of the matter, include Parks v. "Mr. 
Ford", 678 FRD 305 (DC Pa, 1975); Samuel C. Ennis & Co. v. 
Woodmar Realty Co. 89 FRD 136 (ND 111 1981) . The cases which 
permit a Rule 59 motion after summary judgment appear to be 
better reasoned and more persuasive. 
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D. Utah law allows a URCP 59 motion after summary judgment. 
Judge Murphy attempts to distinguish this Court's decision in 
Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray, 590 P2d 309, 310-311 (Utah 
1979)
 f where this Court held that a URCP 59(a) motion may be 
used for the purpose of reversing a judgment denying a writ of 
mandamus, by stating that it is "instructive but not controlling 
in the context of a summary judgment". In Humef supra, an 
action for a writ of mandate was filed in the District Court 
seeking to compel the small claims court to honor an appeal that 
had been filed within 5 days after Hume learned of the default 
judgment (arguing that the appeal time did not commence until 
notice of judgment), but after the 5 days specified in 78-6-10, 
UCA, 1953 for taking an appeal, after entry of the small claims 
judgment. The District Court denied the application for a writ 
of mandate and Hume filed a URCP 59 motion for a new trial or to 
alter or amend the judgment denying the application for the writ. 
The District Court also denied the URCP 59 motion on grounds 
that it was not the proper procedure. On appeal the Respondent 
argued (in the same manner as Respondents argue in support of 
their motion for summary disposition herein) that the URCP 59 
rule did not extend the time for appeal on the merits, that the 
appeal on the merits was not timely, and that the only matter 
before the Supreme Court was the issue of denial of the URCP 59 
motion. The Supreme Court disagreed, held that an appeal from 
small claims court could be made within 5 days after notice of 
judgment, and that a URCP 59 motion was properly used under those 
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circumstances, and stated that (590 P.2d 309 at 311): 
"A timely motion under Rule 59 terminates the 
running of the time for appeal of a judgment. 
Time for appeal does not begin to run again until 
the order granting or denying such a motion is 
entered. The effect of denying such a motion is 
to reinstate the original judgment, and a timely 
appeal taken therefrom is in reality an appeal 
from that original judgment." 
E. The decision in Hume allows ORCP 59 motion following 
summary judgment. In Hume, suprathere was no formal trial, but 
only a "hearing" where petitioner testified that she had received 
no notice of the default judgment. Whether such testimony is 
given in open court or by affidavit should not alter the rights 
of a party. URCP 1(a) provides: "That they (Rules) shall be 
liberally construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive 
determination of every action." Permitting the District Court 
to review and correct its order following summary judgment 
instead of requiring an appeal to the Supreme Court to correct an 
error complies with the mandate of URCP 1. The same principal of 
law is applicable in our case as in Hume, supra. Under Utah law, 
a URCP 59 motion is not limited to cases where there has been a 
formal trial. To hold to the contrary would be contrary to the 
mandate of URCP 1(a) and would require reversal of the holding in 
Hume, supra. In a like manner, appellants URCP 59 motion in the 
present case terminated the running of the time for appeal, which 
time resumed when that motion was denied. Accordingly, this 
appeal, both on the merits of the case and based upon Judge 
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Murphey's denial of Appellants' URCP 59 motion, is properly 
before the Court and is timely. 
F. Objection to a proposed order under local Rule 2.9 are 
limited to the form, not substance of the order. Judge Murphy 
argues that failure to object to the substance of an order 
somehow constitutes a waiver of the right to file a URCP 59 
motion. We disagree. Local Rule 2.9(b) contemplates objections 
being made to proposed orders which differ from the Court's 
announced decision. There is nothing in Local Rule 2.9 which 
suggests that it may be used as a vehicle to contest the 
substance of the Court's decision, which more properly should be 
contested by a URCP 59 motion. Local Rule 2.9 does not 
contemplate objections going to the merits of the Court's ruling, 
the filing of memorandums, or oral argument. It is simply a 
procedure rule designed to assure that the court's decision is 
properly worded to accurately states the substance of the Court's 
ruling. If Local Rule 2.9 is to be expanded in such a manner it 
should be done by an amendment to the rule, not by a judicial 
decision. 
G. The fact that other procedures might have been employed 
in effort to persuade court is not waiver of rights under ORCP 
59. The fact that Appellants might have filed further 
memorandums at an earlier time (page 9 of memo opinion, R-185) 
does not deprive Appellants of their right to move for a new 
trial or to correct the judgment under URCP 59. The purposes of 
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a URCP 59 motion is to give the Court an opportunity to correct 
errors to avoid the necessity of an appeal. 
H. Resignation of Judge Fishier should not affect 
Appellants1 rights. But for the resignation of Judge Fishier the 
URCP 59 motion would have been heard by him. Appellants are at 
a disadvantage over which they had no control because the case 
was transferred to a new judge who was less familiar with the 
case. Change of judges should not affect Appellants' right to 
file and argue their URCP 59 motion before taking an appeal or 
their right to appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
Meritorious issues remain for appeal. Respondent's 
conclusionary statement that because affidavits and/or 
memorandums were not filed in opposition to the motion for 
summary judgment there is allegedly no dispute in the record as 
to any material factf is incorrect. Counter-affidvits are not 
necessary where the dispute is a matter of record. The issues 
raised by this appeal are meritorius, involving Appellants 
property rights to the vacated street property as well as their 
right to bring a Rule 59 Motion. 
For the foregoing reasons/ Appellants move this Court for an 
order remanding granting the relief prayed for. 
Dated the 17th day of November, 1987. > 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused 4 copies of the foregoing to 
be hand-delivered this 17th day of November, 1987, pursuant to 
Rule 26(b) Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure to: 
Patrick J. 0'Hara, Esq.,Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy, 
50 South Main Street #1600, Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Larr'y L.^Whyte" 
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ADDENDUM 
A. EXHIBITS 
Ordinance Vacating Street, Bill no 172 
Exhibit I 
STATE OF UTAH, \ 
[ ss. 
City and County of Salt Lake, ) 
If Mildred V. Higham , City Recorder of Salt Lake City, Utah, do hereby 
certify that the attached document is a full, true and correct copy of B i l l No. 172 of 1977* 
vacating F ir s t South Street between..iMO...W.est....Sjt.i:ee.t..iand...XlO.Q...Wes.t 
located in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, October 5, 19 77 
as appears of record in my office. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the corporate seal of said 
City, this ? l s t . day of December 19.7.8.. 
(SEAL) 
City Recorder 
mm ORDINANCE 
AN OROINANCE VAC-
ATI NG First South Street be-
tween 1000 West Street and UOO 
West Street located in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. 
Be it ordained by the Board of 
Commissioners of Salt Lake 
City, Utah: 
SECTION 1. That First South 
Street between 1000 West Street 
and 1100 West Street located in 
Salt Lake City, Utah, more 
particularly described as fol-
lows, be. and the same hereby 
is. vacated and declared no 
longer to be public property for 
use as a street, avenue, alley or 
pedestrian way: 
Beginning at the Southeast 
corner of Lot 1, Block 53. Plat 
"C", Salt Lake City Survey, 
said point also being the North-
west corner of 1000 West Street 
and First South Street, and 
running thence South 132.06 
feet; thence West 4*0.00 feet; 
thence North 132.09feet; thence 
East 6*0.00 feet to point of 
beginning. Contains 87.169.5 
SQuare feet, or 2.001 acres. 
Said vacation is made ex-
pressly subiect to all existing 
rights of way and easements of 
all public utilities of any and 
every description now located 
on. in, under or over the 
confines of the above described 
property, and also subiect to 
the rights of entry thereon for 
the purpose of maintaining, 
altering, repairing, replacing, 
removing or rerouting said 
utilities and all of them. 
SECTION 2. This ordinance 
shall take effect 30 days after 
its first publication. 
Passed by the Board of Com-
missioners of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this 5th day of October, 
1977. 
TED L. WILSON 
MAYOR 
MILDRED V.HIGHAM 
CITY RECORDER (SEAL) 
BILL NO. 172 of 1977 
Published October 15.1977 < B-9> 
Ordinance Vacating Street, Bill no 173 
Exhibit II 
STATE OF UTAH, 
City and County of Salt Lake, 
I, M i ldred V. H i g h a m # aty ReC o r d e r o f g ^ ^ ^ C i t y > u t a h d o h e r e b y 
certify that the attached document is a full, true and correct copy of B i l l No. 173, an 
o r d i n a n c ? . v a c a t i n 8 G l e n d a l e and Firs t South Stree t s west of llflO West 
Street located i n . S a l t Lake .CityJ . .Utah. 
passed by the Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake City, Utah, October 5, 1977 
as appears of record in my office. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the corporate seal of said 
City, this 2.ist day of December 1978-
(SEAL) 
\/^UJJAL£:J:,//(JJ^ n c.... 
/ City Recorder 
RHHKK«X^ 
ss. 
AN ORDINANCE 
AN ORDINANCE VACAT-
ING Glendale and First South 
Streets west of 1100 West Street 
located in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Be it ordained by the Board of 
Commissioners of Salt Lake 
C1tv, Utah: 
SECTION 1. That Glendale 
and First Sooth Streets west of 
1100 West Street located in Salt 
Lake City, Utah, more particu-
larly described as follows, be, 
and Itm same hereby is, vac-
ated and declared no longer to 
be public property for use as a 
street, ay^nue, alley or pedes-
trian way: 
Beginning at the Southeast 
corner of Lot 1, Block 1, Jones' 
Subdivision, Block 54, Plat "C", 
Salt Lake City Survey, said 
point also being the Northwest 
corner of 1100 West and First 
South Streets; and running 
thence South 0° 2' 53" East 
132.17 feet; thence West 334.00 
feet; thence North <f 00/ 55" 
West 214.63 feet to the North-
east corner of Lot 1, Block 2, 
said Jones' Subdivision; thence 
North 33* 42' East 59.48 feet; 
thence East 36.00 feet to the 
Northwest corner of Lot 2, 
Block 1, said Jones' Subdivi-
sion; thence South 132.00 feet; 
thence East 264.00 feet to point 
of beginning. Contains 51,433.32 
square feet, or 1.190 acres. 
Said vacation Is made ex-
pressly subject to all existing 
rights of way and easements of 
all public utilities of any and 
every description now located 
on, in, under or over the 
confines of the above described 
property, and also subiect to 
the rights of entry thereon for 
the purpose of maintaining, 
altering, repairing, replacing, 
removing or rerouting said 
utilities and all of them. 
SECTION 2. This ordinance 
shall take effect 30 days after 
Its first publication. 
Passed by the Board of Com-
missioners of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, this 5th day of October, 
1977. 
TED L. WILSON 
Mayor 
MILDRED V.HIGHAM 
City Recorder (SEAL) 
BILL NO. 173 of 1977 
Published October 15.1977 
Motion to Intervene Case No. 78-7764 
Exhibit III 
JAN 
m.sui\!.sh 
3r-
M O T I O N 
C i v i l No. 78-7764 
David B. Boyce 
of BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
Attorneys for Interveners 
500 American Savings Building 
61 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone 531-8300 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO., 
Defendant. 
* * * 
LEMEL CORPORATION, MELVIN E. 
INGERSOLL, MARIAN INGERSOLL, 
his wife, LELAND R. INGERSOLL, 
EVELYN E. INGERSOLL, his wife, 
Applicants for Intervention. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Come now Lemel Corporation, Melvin E. Ingersoll, 
Marian Ingersoll, his wife, Leland R. Ingersoll and Evelyn E. 
Ingersoll, his wife, Applicants for Intervention, and move the 
Court for leave to intervene as parties plaintiff in this 
action in order to assert their interests in the claims set 
forth in the complaint of the plaintiff, which is adopted by the 
Applicants for Intervention for the present time as complaint 
of Applicants for Intervention, reserving the right to any 
action Applicants for Intervention may have against plaintiff. 
This motion is made pursuant to Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure and for the reasons that the represent-
ation of the Applicants' interest by existing parties may be 
inadequate and the Applicants may be bound by a judgment in the 
action and because the Applicants are so situated as to be 
adversely affected by a disposition of the matter and because 
the Applicants' claim and the main action have common questions 
of law and fact. 
Dated thio 5th day of January, 1979. 
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH 
UCUTJcL CJU 
David B. Boyce 
Attorneys for Applicant^ for Intervention 
500 American Savings Building 
61 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 5th day of January, 1979, 
a copy of the foregoing instrument was mailed, postage prepaid, 
as follows: 
James S. Lowrie 
Thomas E K. Cerruti 
JONES, WALDO, H0LBR00K & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
800 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ZJ^^J,)6K. t£l7.rJL 
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Motion to Dismiss Case No. 7 8-7764 
Exhibit IV 
James S . L o w r i e , E s q . , and **™*mm^/&&foliitf 
Thomas E. K. C e r r u t i , E s q . , o f PEHJTY CUM* 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUCH 
A t t o r n e y s f o r D e f e n d a n t 
800 W a l k e r Bank B u i l d i n g 
S a l t L a k e C i t y , U t a h 8 4 1 1 1 
T e l e p h o n e : 5 2 1 - 3 2 0 0 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. C 78 7764 vs. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO., 
Defendant. 
oooOooo 
The Defendant, Mountain Fuel Supply Co., by and 
through its counsel, moves the Court pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismiss this matter 
on the grounds that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon 
which relief can be aranted. 
This Motion is based in part on two Salt Lake City 
ordinances which were filed on December 28, 19 78, and therefore 
may properly be treated pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure as a motion for summary judgment. 
Defendant will seek, pursuant to its Motion to Shorten 
Time for Hearing, to have this motion heard contemporaneously 
with Plaintiffs Order to Show Cause Bearing \*hich is ir> the nature 
of a preliminary injunction. 
DATED this if£ day of January, 1979. 
JONE^, WALDO, HOI^OOK^ MCDONOUGH 
B> . 
Tames S. Lowrie^ 
Thomas E. K, Cerruti 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Order Dismiss inteverners Case No. 7 8-7764 
Exhibit V 
James S. Lowrie, and - -- » 
Thomas E. K. Cerruti, of 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Mountain Fuel Supply Company and 
Latin America Assembly of God, Inc. 
800 Walker Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTIRCT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
oooOooo 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO., 
LEMEL CORPORATION, and 
LATIN AMERICA ASSEMBLY 
OF GOD, INC., 
Defendants. 
LEMEL CORPORATION, MELVIN E. 
INGERSOLL, MARIAN INGERSOLL, 
his wife, LELAND R. INGERSOLL, 
EVELYN E. INGERSOLL, his wife, 
Interveners, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO., 
and SALT LAKE CITY, 
Defendants and 
Cross-Defendants. 
oooOooo 
The motion for summary judgment of Defendants Mountain 
Fuel Supply Company against Interveners, Lemel Corporation, 
Melvin E. Ingersoll, Marian Ingersoll, his wife, Leland R. 
Ingersoll and Evelyn E. Ingersoll, his wife, having come 
on to be heard pursuant to notice and the Court having heard 
* ? • » . c. 
O R D E R 
Civil No. C-78-7764 
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representations of counsel for Mountain Fuel Supply Company 
and no objections being lodged by the Plaintiff Salt Lake 
City Corporation and no one appearing on behalf of the 
Interveners and the Court having considered the matters on 
file and being of the opinion that the motion for summary 
judgment by Mountain Fuel should be granted, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Mountain Fuel Supply Company 
is granted summary judgment against Interveners on their 
amended complaint and said complaint shall be dismissed with 
prejudice on the merit|_ 
DATED this //Vyaay of J L ^ v / S ^ ^ L ^ 1982 
BY THE COURT: 
Judgment Case No. 78-7764 
Exhibit VI 
FILE"- •• 0 E r*" - -p i C r 
S4LT • • - • - ,n:r, llt-l' 
FEB 2 II33 a r 8 3 
D C - f ' t T V CLERK James S. Lowrie, and Thomas E. K. Cerruti, of 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendants 
800 Walker Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3200 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO., 
LEMEL CORPORATION and 
LATIN AMERICA ASSEMBLY OF 
GOD, INC. 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C78-7764 
The trial of the above-captioned matter came on 
before this Court on the 8th day of November, 1982, with 
plaintiff, Salt Lake City, represented by Judy F. Lever, Esq. 
and defendants, Mountain Fuel Supply Company and Latin America 
Assembly of God, Inc. represented by James S. Lowrie, Esq. and 
Thomas E. K. Cerruti, Esq. The Court has heretofore entered 
a Memorandum Decision and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law. The Court now enters its 
JUDGMENT 
1. Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the 
defendants on the Complaint of plaintiff, Salt Lake City, and 
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plaintiff's claims are hereby dismissed no cause of action and 
with prejudice on the merits. 
2. Salt Lake City Ordinances 172 and 173 of 1977 are 
hereby declared to be valid and to have vested title to the 
land described in each of said Ordinances in the abutting land 
Owners. 
DATED this ^ ( day of January, 1983. 
BY THE COURT: 
Tfavld B. Dee, 
District Judge 
A<L 
Memorandum Opinion and Order C-85-0790 
Exhibit VII 
RONALD C. BATJE33 
AHy. At Law 
DEC 41S86 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
INTERSTATE LAND CORPORATION, 
a Utah corporation, 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND 
ORDER 
CIVIL NO. C 85-790 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R. D. PATTERSON 
Defendant. 
This matter came before the court on the motions of 
defendant R. D. Patterson and proposed Intervenors to correct 
previous orders. The motions are expressly premised on Rules 
59(a)(6) and (7), 59(d), 59(e), 60(b), U.R.C.P., "or other 
applicable rules" and are directed at the following orders: 
1. Order Denying Motion to Intervene Filed by Melvin E. 
Ingersoll, Marian Beverly Ingersoll, Leland R. Ingersoll, 
and Evelyn E. Ingersoll, dated September 4, 1986 
(hereinafter referred to as the "order denying 
intervention"). 
2. Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
against Defendant, dated September 4, 1986 (hereinafter 
referred to as "summary judgment order"). 
The motions in question are contained in a single pleading 
dated September 13, 1986 and filed on September 15, 1986. It 
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was plaintiff, however, that caused the motions to be heard by 
the court on October 20, 1986, by its filing of a Notice of 
Hearing. 
The court heard the arguments of counsel on October 20, 
1986, at 2:00 o,clock p.m., and took the matter under advisement. 
Thereafter, the court reviewed the entire file, including 
specifically the plaintiff's original Motion for Summary Judgment 
and supporting papers, the original Motion to Intervene and 
Proposed Complaint in Intervention and the transcript of the 
hearing of May 5, 1986 on the plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and proposed Interveners' Motion to Intervene 
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "the original motions"). 
The following procedural facts are significant: 
1. The original motions were fully presented to the court 
and argued on May 5, 1986. No legal memoranda, brief or 
evidence were submitted by the defendant or the proposed 
Interveners. At that hearing, counsel for the proposed 
Intervenors proposed to submit a post hearing memorandum 
(Tr. p. 13) but none was forthcoming. 
2. The court, per Judge Fishier, took the matter under 
advisement and thereafter issued his ruling by means of a 
minute entry dated July 28, 1986. 
3. Proposed written orders incorporating the court's ruling 
were mailed by plaintiff to opposing counsel on August 1, 
1986. Defendant and proposed Intervenors did not object to 
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the form or substance of these proposed orders. Thereafter, 
on September 4, 1986, the order denying intervention and the 
summary judgment order were entered by the court per Judge 
Daniels, Judge Fishier having previously resigned his 
position on the court. 
4. The tenth day following entry of the summary judgment 
order fell on a weekend and defendant filed the motions 
challenging the summary judgment order on September 15, 
1986, the next succeeding day which was not a weekend or 
legal holiday. Consequently, if such motions were proper 
under Rule 59, U.R.C.P., they were timely filed under Rule 
59(b). 
The primary issue presented is whether the motions in 
question are truly Rule 59 motions. The resolution of this issue 
impacts not only the consideration of the motions by this court 
but, more significantly, the finality of the judgment in question 
and thus the timeliness of any appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Utah. For the reasons set forth below, this court deems the 
motions as not properly filed under Rule 59. 
The motions in question are premised in part on Rule 
59(a)(6) and (7) and 59(d). Each of these subdivisions expressly 
reference a "new trial" as the contemplated relief. 
Consequently, they are applicable only when a trial has preceded 
the motion. In summary judgment proceedings no trial takes place 
and, in accordance with Rule 52(a), findings and conclusions are 
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unnecessary. Thus, a challenge to the entry of the summary 
judgment order cannot be premised on subdivisions (a) or (d) of 
Rule 59. Additionally, Rule 52(b) is inapplicable to the summary 
judgment proceedings. 
The remaining question under Rule 59 is whether subdivision 
(e) is a proper vehicle to challenge the rendering of a summary 
judgment. Depending on the resolution of this remaining 
question, a further issue may be whether Rule 59(e) is 
appropriate to challenge a summary judgment when no new evidence, 
fact or even legal argument is presented in support of the Rule 
59(e) motion. 
Rule 59(e), which is identical to Rule 59(e) of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, has been a part of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure from their inception. Rule 59(e) was, however, 
an addition to the federal rules in the 1946 amendments. The 
Advisory Committee Notes to the federal rules indicate that 
subdivision (e) was w... added to care for a situation such as 
that arising in Boaz v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York. ... 146 
F.2d 321 [(8th Cir. 1944)] and makes clear that the district 
court possesses the power asserted in that case to alter or amend 
a judgment after its entry.11 In Boaz the court held that the 
district court had inherent power to amend a judgment of 
dismissal without prejudice to a judgment of dismissal with 
prejudice. While such power of amendment inheres in the court 
rendering the judgment, the use of Rule 59(e) for amendment of 
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judgment is applicable in very limited situations such as those 
presented in Boaz. The Advisory Committee Notes themselves thus 
suggest that Rule 59(e) was not intended for the wholesale 
challenge of judgments when the other provisions of Rule 59 do 
not apply. 
In the instant case, the Rule 59(e) motion does pose a 
wholesale attack on the summary judgment order. While cast as a 
Rule 59 motion, it is in fact a motion to reconsider. There are 
various specific rules which allow a party to seek reconsidera-
tion following a trial. Rules 50(b), 52(b) and Rule 59, U.R.C.P. 
The logical place for a similar rule upon which to premise a 
reconsideration of a summary judgment would be in a subdivision 
of Rule 56. No such rule, however, exists. 
Provision of an express and specific mechanism to reconsider 
a final judgment, such as those prescribed in Rules 50(b), 52((b) 
and 59, is necessary so that a motion for reconsideration can 
stay the running of the time for filing a notice of appeal. To 
allow Rule 59(e) to be used as a catchall means to seek 
reconsideration of any final judgment merely provides a means to 
challenge the integrity and finality of this court1s judgments 
and allows the moving party further time within which to file an 
appeal. 
There are numerous thresholds in summary judgment 
proceedings in which a party opposing the motion may be heard. 
Quite obviously, the party may submit opposing papers, memoranda 
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and briefs and be heard at oral argument. Following any hearing 
and while the court has the matter under advisement, the party 
opposing the motion may make further submissions. Even if the 
matter is not taken under advisement, a signed judgment is always 
necessary under Rule 58A. Rule 2.9 of the District Court Rules 
of Practice requires service of a proposed judgment on opposing 
counsel and allows five days for objection. Only then can the 
final judgment be entered. Thus, Rule 2o9 provides the opposing 
party with an opportunity by means of objection to convince the 
court that its previously ruling was erroneous. No further 
mechanism for reconsideration is necessary or desirable. 
The instant case is illustrative. The plaintiff originally 
presented this matter to the court on May 5, 1986, in a hearing 
on its Motion for Summary Judgment. Defense counsel had the 
opportunity to file papers, memoranda, and affidavits in 
opposition. No such items were filed. Counsel for the proposed 
Interveners filed a Motion to Intervene and a Proposed Complaint 
in Intervention. At the hearing on plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, defense counsel and counsel for the proposed 
Intervenors were heard. 
The court thereafter had the matter under advisement for 
over two months during which time defendants and the proposed 
Intervenors made no filings or submissions. While counsel for 
the proposed Intervenors did propose to file a post hearing 
memorandum (Tr. p. 13), none was forthcoming. It is particularly 
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significant that at no time have defendant or the proposed 
Intervenors submitted affidavits or the like raising a genuine 
issue of material fact. Following the minute entry of July 28, 
1986, which was mailed to all counsel, neither defendant nor the 
proposed Intervenors requested this court to reconsider its 
ruling. Moreover, no objections to the proposed judgment 
submitted by plaintiff1s counsel were interposed under Rule 2.9 
of the District Court Rules of Practice. 
Defendant and the proposed Intervenors now, however, seek to 
have this court reconsider its final judgment by means of its 
Rule 59 motions. At the hearing of October 20, 1986, counsel for 
defendant and intervenors admitted on the record that there was 
nothing before the court, including new legal arguments, that had 
not previously been submitted and argued at the May 5 hearing on 
the original motions. The only thing different was that there 
was a new judge, Judge Fishier having resigned before the formal 
entry of the written judgment. 
The courts which have addressed the issue are split, some 
holding that Rule 59(e) is not a proper vehicle to challenge a 
summary judgment and others holding to the contrary. E.g., 
compare Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 344 F Supp. 367 (S.D. 
Fla. 1972) and Durkin v. Tavlor, 444 F. Supp. 879, 889-90 (E. D. 
Va. 1977) with Sidnev-Vinstein v. A. H. Robins Co., 697 F. 2d 
880, 885 (9th Cir. 1983) and Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II. 
Ltd., 652 F. 2d 808 (9th Cir. 1981). See also Jetero Constr. Co. 
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v. South Memphis Lumber Co., 531 F. 2d 1348, 1351-52 (6th Cir. 
1976). 
Hume v. Small Claims Court of Murray City, 590 P. 2d 309, 
310-311 (Utah 1979) addresses the issue from the standpoint of a 
denial of a petition for a writ of mandamus. To that extent it 
is instructive but not controlling in the context of a summary 
judgment. In the latter context many more opportunities are 
generally available for parties and advocates to present 
argument. Parties opposing summary judgment are also generally 
presented an opportunity by means of objections under Rule 2.9 to 
convince the court prior to entry of judgment that its ruling was 
erroneous. 
Even if Rule 59(e) was generally deemed a proper mechanism 
to challenge a summary judgment, it should not be deemed a proper 
use of such mechanism when no new fact, piece of evidence or even 
legal argument is presented in support of a Rule 59(e) motion or 
when a party opposing summary judgment fails to object to a 
proposed judgment under Rule 2.9. Under such circumstances, the 
party opposing summary judgment should pursue their remedy by 
appeal rather than a motion for reconsideration under the guise 
of Rule 59(e). 
For the reasons set forth above, defendant's Rule 59 motions 
are denied as being improperly premised on Rule 59. Proposed 
Intervenors' motion for reconsideration cannot even be deemed to 
be premised on Rule 59 since they were not parties to the 
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proceeding when summary judgment was granted. In the event this 
matter is appealed and this courtfs view of Rule 59 is correct, 
plaintiff might be able to avoid some of the additional delay by 
moving for summary disposition under Rule 10, U.R.A.P. on the 
grounds that the notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days 
following judgment. 
Because the Utah Supreme Court could disagree with the views 
expressed herein and to avoid any possible remand solely for this 
court to reconsider its judgment pursuant to the defendant's Rule 
59 motions, the court has considered the entire record and finds 
no manifest error underlying the orders entered on September 4, 
1986. The court particularly notes that it has not yet been 
presented with any matter by defendant or otherwise which tends 
to raise a genuine issue of material fact. For these reasons, 
even if defendant's motions should be deemed properly presented 
under Rule 59, the motions are denied. 
The court further denies defendant's motion under Rule 60(b) 
for the reason that it is a motion to reconsider and is not 
properly premised on the grounds specified in Rule 60(b). See 
Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 367 (S.D. Fla, 
1972) . The only surprise that has been asserted was expressly 
asserted at the May 5, 1986 hearing, over four months preceding 
the filing of these motions, and no further memorandum was filed 
after the May 5 hearing as promised. 
It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that 
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defendant's and proposed Intervenors1 motions under Rule 59(a)(6) 
and (7), 59(d), 59(e), 60(b), U.R.C.P., "or other applicable 
rules" are hereby denied. 
DATED THIS 2nd day of December, 1986. 
it 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum Opinion and Order, postage prepaid, to 
Ronald C. Barker, Esq. 
2870 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115-3692 
Patrick O'Hara, Esq. 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Ralph J. Hafen, Esq. 
402 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
This p(c—£- day of December, 1986. 
V<//jj£t \JziU/.C& 
Notice of Automatic Stay Case No. 78-7764 
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David E. Leta 
ROE AND FOWLER 
Attorneys for LeMel Corporation 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 328-9841 
S A I - ^ • • ' ••" 
JUL 31 iGujJITBI 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN FUEL SUPPLY CO., et al., 
Defendants. 
LEMEL CORPORATION, MELVIN E. 
1NGERSOLL, MARIAN INGERSOLL, 
his wife, LELAND R. INGERSOLL, 
and EVELYN E. INGERSOLL, his wife, 
Interveners. 
NOTICE OF 
AUTOMATIC STAY 
Civil No. 78-7764 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that on January 5, 1981, LeMel Corporation 
filed a petition for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States 
Bankruptcy Code, Bankruptcy No. 80-00755, in the United States 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, Central Division. 
The filing of the petition by the debtor operates as a stay of all 
judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings against the debtor and its 
property as provided in 11 U.S.C. § 362. 
Furthermore, all actions taken after the date of the filing of the 
petition in violation of the stay are void and without affect. 
DATED this I*) day of July, 1981. 
Da via E\Letav 
ROE AND FOWLER 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for LeMel Corporation 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the l7jCfL> day of July, 1981, I served 
the foregoing Notice of Automatic Stay upon Judy F. Lever, attorney 
for Salt Lake City, by depositing a copy thereof in the United States 
mails, postage prepaid, addressed as follows: 
Judy F. Lever, Esq. 
Assistant City Attorney 
100 City and County Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
B. STATUTE TEXTS 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-12-13 
Rule 24 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (All portions) 
Rule 59 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (All portions) 
Rule 59f Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (All portions) 
District Court Local Rule 2.9(b) 
UTAH CODE 
1987-1988 Judicial Code 78-2-2. 
three years. The current judicial council shall cont-
inue in existence with full authority until the election 
of the members of the council as provided in this 
section. 
(2) The appellate court nominating commission 
established by Subsection 20-1-7.2(1) may not be 
convened initially prior to July 1, 1986 nor later 
than September 1,1986. 
(3) The provisions in this act for court jurisdict-
ions may not be implemented until January 1, 1987. 
Courts then continue to have jurisdiction to dispose 
of any cases pending on that date. 
(4Xa) Any justice or judge of a court of record, 
whose election to office was effective on or before 
July 1, 1985, shall hold the office for the remainder 
of the term to which he was elected. The justice or 
judge is subject to an unopposed retention election 
as provided by law at the general election immedi-
ately preceding the expiration of the respective term 
of office. 
(b) Any justice or judge of a court of record 
whose appointment to office was effective on or 
before July 1, 1985, is subject to an unopposed 
retention election as provided by law at the first 
general election held more than three years after the 
date of the appointment. 
(c) Any justice or judge of a court of record 
whose appointment to office was effective after July 
1, 1985, is subject to an unopposed retention elec-
tion as provided by law at the first general election 
held more than three years after the date of the 
appointment. i*Js 
Chapter 2. Supreme Court 
78-2-1. Number of Justices * Term - Retirement -
Chief justice tail associate chief justice - Selection aad 
functions. 
78-2-1.5. Repealed. 
78-2-1.6. Repealed. 
78-2-2. (Effective through December 31, 1987). Supreme 
Court Jurisdiction. 
Tt-2-2. (Effective January 1, 1988). Supreme Court 
jurisdiction. 
78-2-3. Repealed. 
78-2-4. Supreme Court - Rulemaking, Judges pro 
tempore, and practice of law. 
78-2-5. Court always open for transaction of business. 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
78-2-7 through 78-2-10. Repealed. 
78-2-11. Reporter • Deputy clerks - Assistants. 
78-2-12. Postage aad office supplies. 
78-2-13. Bailiff* and assistant librarian. 
78-2-14. Sheriffs to attend and serve. 
78-2-1. Number of justices - Term -
Retirement • Chief justice and associate chief 
justice - Selection and functions. 
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices. 
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be app-
ointed initially to serve until the first general elec-
tion held more than three years after the effective 
date of the appointment. Thereafter, the term of 
office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten years 
and until his successor is appointed and approved in 
accordance with Section 20-1 -7.1. 
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a 
chief justice from among the members of the court 
by a majority vote of all justices. The term of the 
office of chief justice is four years. The chief justice 
may not serve successive terms. The chief justice 
may resign from the office of chief justice without 
resigning from the Supreme Court. The chief justice 
may be removed from the office of chief justice by 
a majority vote of all justices of the Supreme Court. 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice 
within 30 days of a vacancy in that office, the ass-
ociate chief justice shall act as chief justice until a 
chief justice is elected under this section. If the 
associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to act 
as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as 
chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this 
section. 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a 
member of the Supreme Court, the chief justice has 
additional duties as provided by law. 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief 
justice. The term of office of the associate chief 
justice is two years. The associate chief justice may 
serve in that office no more than two successive 
terms. The associate chief justice shall be elected by 
a majority vote of the members of the Supreme 
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief 
justice decides. If the chief justice is absent or oth-
erwise unable to serve, the associate chief justice 
shall serve as chief justice. The chief justice, where 
not inconsistent with law, may delegate responsibi-
lities to the associate chief justice. lfns 
78-2-1.5. Repealed. trzi 
7S-2-1.6. Repealed. mi 
78-2-2. (Effective through December 31, 1987). 
Supreme Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
answer questions of state law certified by a court of 
the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue 
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its 
jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the 
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the 
Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Com-
mission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating 
in: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(iii) the Board of State Lands; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and 
(v) the state engineer; 
(0 a final judgment or decree of any court of 
record holding a statute of the United States or this 
state unconstitutional on its face under the Consti-
tution of the United States or the Utah Constitu-
tion; 
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record involving a charge of a first degree or capital 
felony; 
(h) appeals from the district court involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and 
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of an> court 
of record over which the Court of Appeals does not 
have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court 
of Appeals any of the matters over which the 
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except for the following matters: 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
CODE* Co 
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(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
(!) taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3Xa) 
through (h). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, 
but the Supreme Court shall review those cases 
certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subs-
ection (3Kb). IN* 
78-2-2. (Effective January 1, 1988). Supreme 
Court jurisdiction. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
answer questions of state law certified by a court of 
the United States. 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to 
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue 
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect 
its orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its 
jurisdiction. 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, 
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals; 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the 
Court of Appeals prior to final judgment by the 
Court of Appeals; 
(c) discipline of lawyers; 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Com-
mission; 
(e) final orders and decrees in cases originating 
in: 
(i) the Public Service Commission; 
(ii) the State Tax Commission; 
(Hi) the Board of State Lands; 
(iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining; and 
(v) the state engineer; 
( 0 a final judgment or decree of any court of 
record holding a statute of the United States or this 
state unconstitutional on its face under the Consti-
tution of the United States or the Utah Constitu-
tion; 
(g) interlocutory appeals from any court of 
record involving a charge of a first degree or capital 
felony; 
(h) appeals from the district court involving a 
conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and 
(i) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court 
of record over which the Court of Appeals does not 
have original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court 
of Appeals any of the matters over which the 
Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, 
except for the following matters: 
(a) first degree and capital felony convictions; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) general water adjudication; 
( 0 taxation and revenue; and 
(g) those matters described in Subsection (3Ma) 
through (h). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in 
granting or denying a petition for writ of certiorari 
for the review of a Court of Appeals adjudication, 
but the Supreme Court shall review those cases 
certified to it by the Court of Appeals under Subs-
ection (3Kb). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the 
requirements of Chapter 46b, Title 63, in its review 
of agency adjudicative proceedings. wtr 
78-2-3. Repealed. vm 
78-2-4. Supreme Court - Rulemaking, judges 
pro tempore, and practice of law. i 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of pro-" 
cedure and evidence for use in the courts of the; 
state and shall by rule manage the appellate process.' 
The Legislature may amend the rules of procedure^ 
and evidence adopted by the Supreme Court upon *£ 
vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses 
of the Legislature. ? 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah, 
Constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may aut-
horize retired justices and judges and judges pro^ 
tempore to perform any judicial duties. Judges pro 
tempore shall be citizens of the United States, Utah ; 
residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the 
practice of law, including admission to practice law 
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted 
to the practice of law. its* 
78-2-5c Court always open for transaction of 
business. 
The Supreme Court shall always be open for the 
transaction of business. Adjournments from day to 
day, or from time to time, are to be construed as 
recesses in the sessions, and shall not prevent the 
court from sitting at any time. lfSJ 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint 
clerks and support staff as necessary for the opera-
tion of the Supreme Court and the Court of > 
Appeals. The duties of the clerks and support staff ,< 
shall be established by the appellate court adminis-1 
trator, and powers established by rule of the ; 
Supreme Court. i*«* 
78-2-7 through 78-2-10. Repealed. its* . 
78-2-11. Reporter • Deputy clerks - Assistants. 
The Supreme Court shall appoint a reporter of its \ 
decisions who shall hold office during the pleasure 
of the court, and may appoint, remove at pleasure, ' 
and fix the compensation for such deputy clerks and
 : 
other assistants as may be necessary for the transa- • 
ction of the business of the court. im 
78-2-12. Postage and office supplies. 
Stationery, postage and supplies necessary for the 
transaction of the business of the Supreme Court, 
including the printing of the court docket, shall be 
furnished by the purchasing department or officer 
of the state, on requisition therefor made through 
the clerk. its* 
78-2-13. Bailiffs and assistant librarian. 
The court is hereby authorized to appoint and 
remove at pleasure the necessary bailiffs to attend 
the court, and to perform such other duties and 
execute such orders as may be directed or made by 
the court. The court may also appoint and remove 
at pleasure an assistant librarian, who shall perform 
such duties as the court may order or direct. itw 
78-2-14, Sheriffs to attend and serve. 
The court may at any time require the attendance 
and services of any sheriff in the state. 1*53 
Chapter 2a. Court of Appeals 
78-2a-l. Covrt of Aooeefa. 
78»2a-2. Hwmbtr of Jodfts - Fmctiom - Ftttag fees. 
7*.2»-3. (Effective t a m a * December 31,1987). Coort 
of Anne** jortodktton. 
78-2a-3. (Effective Mummy 1, ttJ8>. Cowl of Appeals 
Cox •Co 
1-12-12. Judicial Code UTAH CODE 1987-1988 
tounting to the sum of SS per acre. 1953 
•12-12. Possession must be continuous, and 
taxes paid. 
In no case shall adverse possession be considered 
ablishcd under the provisions of any section of 
is code, unless it shall be shown that the land has 
en occupied and claimed for the period of seven 
ars continuously, and that the party, his predece-
>rs and grantors have paid all taxes which have 
en levied and assessed upon such land according 
law. 1953 
-12-12.1. Possession and payment of taxes -
Proviso • Tax title. 
In no case shall adverse possession be established 
ider the provisions of this code, unless it shall be 
own that the land has been occupied and claimed 
r the period of seven years continuously, and that 
e party, his predecessors and grantors have paid 
the taxes which have been levied and assessed 
>on such land according to law. Provided, 
iwever, that payment by the holder of a tax title to 
il property or his predecessors, of all the taxes 
/ied and assessed upon such real property after the 
linquent tax sale or transfer under which he 
lims for a period of not less than four years and 
r not less than one year after the effective date of 
is amendment, shall be sufficient to satisfy the 
quirements of this section in regard to the 
lyment of taxes necessary to establish adverse 
^session. I*SJ 
-12-13. Adverse possession of public streets or 
ways. 
No person shall be allowed to acquire any right or 
le in or to any lands held by any town, city or 
unty, or the corporate authorities thereof, desig-
ned for public use as streets, lanes, avenues, 
leys, parks or public squares, or for any other 
iblic purpose, by adverse possession thereof for 
ty length of time whatsoever, unless it shall affir-
atively appear that such town or city or county or 
e corporate authorities thereof have sold, or oth-
wise disposed of, and conveyed such real estate to 
purchaser for a valuable consideration, and that 
r more than seven years subsequent to such con-
yance the purchaser, his grantees or successors in 
terest, have been in the exclusive, continuous and 
Iverse possession of such real estate; in which case 
t adverse title may be acquired. i§» 
t-12-14. Possession of tenant deemed possession 
of landlord. 
When the relation of landlord and tenant has 
istcd between any persons, the possession of the 
nant is deemed the possession of the landlord until 
e expiration of seven years from the termination 
7
 the tenancy, or, where there has been no written 
ase, until the expiration of seven years from the 
me of the last payment of rent, notwithstanding 
at such tenant may have acquired another title, or 
ay have claimed to hold adversely to his landlord; 
it such presumption cannot be made after the 
:riods herein limited. 1*53 
1-12-15. Possession not affected by descent cast. 
The right of a person to the possession of real 
roperty is not impaired or affected by a descent 
1st in consequence of the death of a person in 
Dssession of such property. 1H3 
1-12-16. Action to redeem mortgage of real 
property. 
No action to redeem a mortgage [of] real prop-
t y , with or without an account of rents and 
profits, may be brought by the mortgagor, or those 
claiming under him, against the mortgagee in poss-
ession, or those claiming under him, unless he or 
they have continuously maintained [an] adverse 
possession of the mortgaged premises for seven 
years after breach of some condition o f the mort-
gage. 193) 
78-12-17. When more than one mortgagor. 
If there is more than one such mortgagor, or' 
more than one person claiming under a mortgagor, 
some of whom are not entitled to maintain such an 
action, under the provisions of this article, any one 
of them who is entitled to maintain such an action 
may redeem therein a divided or undivided part of 
the mortgaged premises as his interest may appear, 
and have an accounting for a part of the rents and 
profits, proportionate to his interest in the mortg-
aged premises, on payment of a part of the mort-
gage money, bearing the same proportion to the 
whole of such money as the value of his divided or 
undivided interest in the premises bears to the whole 
of such premises. ms 
78-12-18. Actions to recover estate sold by 
guardian. 
No action for the recovery of any estate sold by a 
guardian can be maintained by the ward, or by any 
person claiming under him, unless it is commenced 
within three years next after the termination of the 
guardianship. I M * 
78-12-19. Actions to recover estate sold by -A 
executor or administrator. 1 
No action for the recovery of any estate sold by. 
an executor or administrator in the course of any* 
probate proceeding can be maintained by any heir 
or other person claiming under the decedent, unless 
it is commenced within three years next after such 
sale. An action to set aside the sale may be instit-
uted and maintained at any time within three years 
from the discovery of the fraud or other lawful 
grounds upon which the action is based. itS3 
78-12-20. Minority or disability prevents running 
of period. •• 
The two preceding sections [78-12-18, 78-12-
191 shall not apply to minors or others under any 
legal disability to sue at the time when the right of 
action first accrues but all such persons may com-
mence an action within the time prescribed in the 
next succeeding section [78-12-21]. it*3 
78-12-21. Disabilities enumerated - Time of not 
reckoned. 
If a person entitled to commence an action for the 
recovery of real property or for the recovery of the 
possession of it, or to make any entry or defense, 
founded on the title to real property or to rents or 
services out of the property, is at the time the title 
first descends or accrues, either under the age of 
majority or mentally incompetent, the time during 
which the disability continues is not a part of the 
time in this article limited for the commencement of 
the actions or the making of the entry or defense. 
Article 2. Other Than Real Property 
78-12-22. Within eight years. 
78-12-23. Within six yean - Mesne profits of real 
property • Instrument in writing • Distribution of 
criminal proceeds to victim. 
78-12-24. Public officers • Within six yean. 
78-12-25. Within four years. 
78-12-23.5. Injury due to defective design or construction 
of improvement to real property • Within seven years. 
78-12-26. Within three years. 
78-12-27. Action against corporate stockholders or 
90 For Annotations, consult C n n r a r n , i Annotatlnn s#rvi>» CoDtoCa 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 24 
sons for his failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort. The 
derivative action may not be maintained if it appears that the plaintiff does 
not fairly and adequately represent the interests of the shareholders or mem-
bers similarly situated in enforcing the right of the corporation or association. 
The action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the 
court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to 
shareholders or members in such manner as the court directs. 
Compiler's Notes. -
to Rule 23.1, F R C P . 
Cross-References. 
holders or directors, 
against, $ 78-12-27 
Corporation defined, 
Sec. 4; § 16-10-2. 
This rule is identical 
— Corporate 
limitation of 
stock-
action 
Utah Const.. Art. XII, 
Extraordinary writs, § 78-35-6 et seq.; Rule 
65B. 
Liability of corporate directors, § 16-10-44. 
Liquidation of corporation, action by or 
against receiver, § 16-10-93. 
Sue and be sued, power of corporation to. 
Utah Const., Art. XII. Sec. 4; § 16-10-4(b>. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Action barred. 
—Plaintiffs not shareholders at time of wrongful act. 
Class action distinguished. 
Action barred. 
—Plaintiffs not shareholders at time of 
wrongful act. 
Shareholders' action against former corpo-
rate directors and officers for alleged conver-
sion of corporate assets and for breach of fidu-
ciary duties was barred by this rule where the 
shareholders did not acquire their stock until 
after the events complained of and the shares 
did not devolve on them by operation of law. 
Noland v. Barton, 741 F.2d 315 (10th Cir. 
1984). 
Class action distinguished. 
Action by corporate shareholders which al-
leged injury to the corporation only, and not to 
them a* individuals, was a derivative action 
and could not be brought as a class action. 
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 
636 (Utah 1980>. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 19 Am. Ju r 2d Corporations 
§ 2250; 59 Am Jur 2d Parties * 77 
C.J.S. — 18 C.J.S. Corporations ^ 564 to 
566. 
A.LoR. — Communications by corporation as 
privileged in stockholders' action, 34 A.L.R.3d 
1106. 
Punitive damages, allowance of in stock-
holder's derivative action, 67 A.L.R.3d 350. 
Application to derivative actions for breach 
of fiduciary duty, under § 36(b) of Investment 
Company Act of 1940 (15 USCS § 80a-35'b", 
of requirement, stated in Rule 23.1 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure that complaint m 
derivative actions allege what efforts were 
made by shareholders to obtain desired action 
or reasons for failure to do so, 65 A.L.R. Fed. 
542. 
Key Numbers. — Corporations «= 206. 207. 
Rule 24. Intervention, 
(a) Intervention of right. Upon timely application anyone shall be permit-
ted to intervene in an action: < 1) when a statute confers an unconditional right 
to intervene; or (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating to the 
property or transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated 
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede 
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lis ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is ade-
quately represented by existing parties. 
(b) Permissive intervention. Upon timely application anyone may be per-
nitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute confers a conditional right 
x> intervene; or (2) when an applicant's claim or defense and the main action 
lave a question of law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for 
fround of claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered 
>y a governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, require-
nent, or agreement issued or made pursuant to the statute or executive order, 
he officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in 
he action. In exercising its discretion the court shall consider whether the 
ntervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of 
he original parties. 
(c) Procedure. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to inter-
ene upon the parties as provided in Rule 5. The motions shall state the 
Tounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the 
laim or defense for which intervention is sought. 
Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1986 amend- Form for motion to intervene as defendant, 
tent combined former Subdivisions (a)(2) and Form 24. 
i)(3) into present Subdivision (a)(2) and re- Misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties, Rule 
Tote the contents thereof. 21 
CompUer^s Notes. - This rule is similar to
 N e c e s s a r y j o i n d e r o f p a r t i e s , R u l e 1 9 . 
Cross-References.- Claims for relief and *aTtie* P l a i n t i f T a n d d e f e n d a n t ' capacity, 
Senses, Rule 8. R u , e 1 7 
Fee for filing complaint in intervention, Permissive joinder of parties, Rule 20. 
21-2-2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
ppeal. 
•Order denying intervention. 
itervention of right. 
•Adverse effect. 
—Court's disposition of property. 
Insurer. 
—Uninsured motorist coverage. 
irisdiction. 
Error by court clerk. 
>stjudgment intervention. 
Not Allowed. 
Showing required. 
meliness. 
Individual facts. 
ppeal. Intervention of right. 
Order denying intervention. —Adverse effect. 
Order which denies with prejudice an appli- Court's disposition of property. 
tion for intervention is appealable. Tracy v. when the application for intervention is 
liversity of Utah Hosp., 619 P.2d 340 (Utah
 m a d e timely, this rule permits intervention as 
80). a matter of right when the applicant will be 
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(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other counties. When any satis-
faction of a judgment shall have been entered on the judgment docket of the 
county where such judgment was first docketed, a certified transcript of satis-
faction, or a certificate by the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed 
with the clerk of the district court in any other county where the judgment 
may have been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket 
shall be made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall have the same 
effect as in the county where the same was originally entered. 
Compiler's Notes. — There is no federal Cross-References. — Fee not charged foi 
rule covering this subject matter filing satisfaction, & 21-2-2. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Court. 
—Duty. 
Attachment. 
Effect. 
—Acceptance of full payment. 
Owner or attorney 
—Vacation of satisfaction. 
Hearing. 
by the judgment Sierra Nevada Mill Co. v. 
Keith O'Brien Co , 48 U. 12, 156 P. 943. 
Owner or attorney. 
—Vacation of satisfaction. 
Hearing. 
The recorded satisfaction of judgment signed 
by judgment creditor cannot be vacated with-
out action and hearing in equity, and the lien 
of an attorney against the proceeds of the judg-
ment does not include his personal right to exe-
cute against the judgment debtor Utah C V. 
Federal Credit Union v. Jenkins, 528 P 2d 
1187 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur . 2d Judgments judgment against one joint tort-feasor as re-
§ 979 et seq. lease of others. 40 A.L.R.3d 1181. 
C.J.S. — 49 C.J.S Judgments ^ 574 to 584 Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 891 to 899. 
A.L.R. — Voluntary payment into court of 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues, for any of 
the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a new trial in an 
action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been 
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of 
law or make new findings and conclusions, and direct the entry of a new 
judgment: 
Court. 
—Duty. 
Attachment. 
Court had duty to make order directing par-
tial satisfaction of judgment to extent of money 
collected through attachment proceeding 
Blake v. Farrell, 31 U 110, 86 P 805 
Effect. 
—Acceptance of full payment. 
When plaintiff voluntarily accepted full pay-
ment of a judgment in his favor, the satisfac-
tion and discharge operated to satisfy and dis-
charge everything merged in and adjudicated 
180 
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(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or adverse party, 
or any order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was 
prevented from having a fair trial 
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or more of the jurors 
have been induced to assent to any general or special verdict, or to a 
finding on any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to a 
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be 
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors 
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have 
guarded against. 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party making the ap-
plication, which he could not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered 
and produced at the trial 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given 
under the influence of passion or prejudice 
<6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other decision, 
or that it is against law 
<7) Error in law 
(b) Time for motion. A motion for a new trial shall be served not later 
than 10 days after the entry of the judgment 
(c) Affidavits; time for filing. When the application for a new trial is 
made under Subdivision (a)(1), (2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affida-
vit Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be 
served with the motion The opposing party has 10 days after such service 
within which to serve opposing affidavits The time within which the affida-
vits or opposing affidavits shall be served may be extended for an additional 
period not exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause shown or by 
the parties by written stipulation The court may permit reply affidavits 
(d) On initiative of court. Not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court of its own initiative may order a new trial for any reason for which it 
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party, and in the order shall 
specify the grounds therefor 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment. A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes*. — This rule is similar to Juror's competency as witness as to vahdit> 
Rule 59, F R C P of verdict or indictment Rules of Evidence, 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion Ruie go6 
for ne* trial * 21-2 2 
Harm?e-*fe error not ground for ne* trial, 
Rule 61 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Abandonment of motion 
Accident or surprise 
Arbitratron awards 
Caption on motion for new trial 
Correction of insufficient or informal verdict 
Correction of record 
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Cir.l9f>M), cert, denied, 35K l . S . 932, 79 S.Ct. 320, 3 
L.Ed.2d 304 (1959); Beacon Fed. S. <& L. Assn. r. Federal 
Home L. Bunk Bd., 260 F.2d 240 (Tth Cir.), cert, denied. 
301 U.S. 823, 80 S.Ct. TO, 4 L.Ed.2d 07 (1959); Ram v. 
Paramount Film D. Corp., 278 F.2d 191 (4th Cir.1900). 
The amended rule eliminates these uncertainties by 
requiring that there he a judgment set out on a separate 
document—distinct from any opinion or memorandum— 
which provides the basis for the entry of judgment. That 
judgments shall be on separate documents is also indi-
cated in Rule 79(b); and see General Rule 10 of the L. S. 
District Courts for the Eastern and Southern Districts of 
New York; Rum v. Paramount Film I). Corp., supra, at 
194. 
See the amendment of Rule 79(a) and the new specimen 
forms of judgment. Forms 31 and 32. 
See also Rule T>f>(b)(l) and (2> covering the subject of 
judgments by default. 
R u l e 5 9 . New T r i a l s ; A m e n d m e n t of J u d g -
m e n t s 
( a ) G r o u n d s . A new trial may he g r a n t e d to all 
or any of the par t ies and on all or par t of the issues 
<1) in an action in which the re has been a trial by 
ju ry , for any of the reasons for which new trials 
have here tofore been g r a n t e d in act ions at law in 
the cour t s of the l 'n i ted S ta te s ; and (2) in an action 
triod without a ju ry , for any of the reasons fur 
which r ehea r ings have here tofore been g r a n t e d in 
su i t s in equity in the cour t s of the l 'n i ted Sui tes . 
On a motion for a new trial in an action tried 
wi thout a jury , the cour t may open the j u d g m e n t if 
one has been en te red , t ake additional tes t imony, 
amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or 
make new findings and conclusions, and direct the 
en t ry of a new j u d g m e n t . 
(b) Time for Motion. A motion for a new trial 
shall be served not la ter than 10 days a f te r the 
en t ry of the j u d g m e n t . 
(e) T i m e for S e r v i n g Affidavi ts . When a mo. 
tion for new trial is based upon affidavits they 
shall be served with the motion. The opposing 
par ty has 10 days a f te r such service within which 
to se rve opposing affidavits , which period may be 
ex tended for an addit ional period not exceeding 20 
d a y s e i ther by the cour t for good cause shown or 
by the par t ies by wr i t t en s t ipulat ion. Tin1 court 
may permit reply aff idavits . 
(d) O n In i t i a t i ve of Court. Not la ter than 10 
days af ter en t ry of j u d g m e n t the cour t of its own 
initiative may o rde r a new trial for any reason for 
which it might have g r a n t e d a new trial on motion 
of a par ty . Af te r giving the par t ies notice and an 
oppor tun i ty to be heard on the ma t t e r , the court 
may g r a n t a motion for a new trial, timely served, 
for a reason not su i t ed in the motion. In e i ther 
Complete Annotation MJ 
case, the court shall specify in the order the 
grounds therefor. 
(e) Motion to Alter or Amend a Judgment. A 
motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be 
served not later than 10 days after entry of the 
judgment. 
(As amended Dec. 27. 1!M«. eff. Mar. 19. 194S; Feb. 28, 
19M. eff. July 1. 19d(i.) 
NOTES OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON R I L E S 
This rule represents an amalgamation of the petition 
for rehearing of former Equity Rule (">9 (Petition for 
Rehearing) and the motion for new trial of 28 U.S.C.. 
§2111. formerly § Ml (New trials; harmless error), made 
in the light of the experience and provision of the code 
States. Compare Calif.Code Civ.Proc. Peering. 1937, 
§§ f,:>r>-tio:{a. 2* l . S . C . § 2111. formerly § Ml (New trials: 
harmless error) is thus substantially continued in this 
rule. C.S.C.. Title 2*. former $ s4<» (Executions; stay on 
conditions) is modified in so far a.- it rontains time provi-
sions inconsistent with Subdivision ib» For the effect of 
the motion for new trial upon the time for taking an 
appeal see }forse r. l'nited States. 192<i. 4tJ S.Ct. 241. 270 
U.S. 1">1, 70 L.Ed. ")1S; Aspen Mininq and Smelting Co. 
v. Billings, 1*9:',. 14 S.Ct. 4. i:><> t ' .S. 31. 37 L.Ed.' 9SG. 
For partial new trials which are permissible under 
Subdivision (a), see (tasoline Products Co.. Inc. c. 
Champlin Refining Co.. 1931. a I S.Ct. ">13. 2S3 L.S. 494. 
7f> L.Ed. \W\ Schurrhol: r. Rnarh. C.C.A.4, 1932. .> 
F.2d 32; Simmons r. Fish, 1912. 97 N.E. 102. 21<> Mass. 
fiGM. Ann.Ca>. 19121). ">ss (sustaining and recommending 
the practice and citing federal cases and cases in accord 
from about sixteen states and contra from three States). 
The procedure in several States provides specifically for 
partial new trials. Ariz.Rev.Code Ann.. Struckmeyer, 
192S. § 3K">2; Calif.Code Civ.Proc. Peering. 1937. $$ i».r>7. 
W>2; Smith-Hurd Ul.Stats., 1937, c. 11<». * 21»i (Par. (f)): 
Md.Ann.Code. Bagby, 1924, Art. 5. §§ 2.">. 2ti: Mich.Court 
Rules Ann.. Searl, i933, Rule 47, § 2; Miss.Sup.Ct.Rule 
12, ltil Miss. 903. 90:>. 1931; N.J.Sup.Ct.Rules 131. 132, 
147. 2 NJ.Misc. 1197. 124o-12f>l. 12.",;,. 1924; 2 N.D. 
Comp.Laws Ann.. 191.3. § 7S44. as amended bv N.D.Laws 
1927. ch. 214. 
1916 AMENDMENT 
Note to Subdivision <b>. With the time for appeal to a 
circuit court of appeals reduced in general to 30 days by 
the proposed amendment of Rule 73(a). the utility of the 
original "except" clause, which permits a motion for a 
new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence to 
be made before the expiration of the time for appeal, 
would have been seriously restricted. It was thought 
advisable, therefore, to take care of this matter in another 
way. By amendment of Rule ti0(b). newly discovered 
evidence is made the basis for relief from a judgment, 
and the maximum time limit has been extended to one 
year. Accordingly the amendment of Rule f>9((>) elimi-
nates the "except" clause and its specific treatment of 
newly discovered evidence as a ground for a motion for 
new trial. This ground remains, however, as a basis for a 
motion for new trial served not later than 10 days after 
the entry of judgment. See also Rule t>0(b). 
als. M * Title 28 U.S.C.A. 
RULES OF PRACTICE—DIST. AND CIR CT Rule 2.9 
movant's facts that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the statement 
of the movant shall be deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment 
unless specifically controverted by the statement of the opposing party. 
(f) Decision shall be rendered without a hearing unless requested by the 
court, in which event the clerk shall set a date and time for such hearing. 
(g) In all cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action 
or any issues thereof on the merits with prejudice, the party resisting the 
motion may request a hearing and such request shall be granted unless the 
motion is summarily denied. If no such request is made within ten (10) days of 
notice to submit for decision, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed waived. 
(h) Provided, however, that any district court and any circuit court by order 
of the judge or judges of the court may exclude that court from the operation of 
this Rule 2.8 in which case an alternative procedure shall be prescribed by 
written administrative order or rule. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Estate of Kav, 705 P 2d 1165 (Utah 
1985* 
Rule 2.9. Written orders, judgments, and decrees. 
fa) In all rulings by a court, counsel for the party or parties obtaining the 
ruling shall within fifteen (15» days, or within shorter time as the court may 
direct, file with the court a proposed order, judgment or decree in conformity 
with the ruling. 
<b> Copies of the proposed findings, judgments, and or orders shall be served 
on opposing counsel before being presented to the court for signature unless 
the court otherwise orders. Notice of objections thereto shall be submitted to 
the court and counsel within (5) days after service. 
(c) Stipulated settlements and dismissals shall be reduced to writing and 
presented to the court for signature within fifteen (15> days of the settlement 
and dismissal. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Applicability 
Signature of court 
—Timing 
Cited 
Applicability. 
This Rule and its requirements are binding 
only upon counsel, not upon the trial court 
Tolboe Constr Co v Staker Paving & Constr 
Co . 882 P2d 843 UHah 1984> 
Signature of court. 
—Timing. 
The fact that the court signed the documents 
prior to plaintiffs submission of objections and 
prior to the expiration of five days from the 
service of the documents did not constitute a 
violation of thi^ rule Tolboe Constr Co v 
Staker Paving & Constr Co , 682 P 2d ^43 
(I 'tah 19M' 
Cited in Larsen v Larsen, 674 P.2d 116 
(Utah 1983) 
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